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Abstract 
 
Understanding what determines Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) inflows remains a primary 
concern of economists and policy makers; yet, the uncertainty surrounding FDI theories and 
empirical approaches has created much ambiguity regarding the determinants of FDI. This 
paper undertakes an exhaustive search for robust determinants of FDI. We apply Extreme 
Bound Analysis to deal with model uncertainty, using a large panel data set that covers 168 
countries from 1970 to 2006. We consider 58 potential determinants of FDI that include 
economic, geographic and political variables. We show that more than half of the previously 
suggested FDI determinants are not robust. Our findings reaffirm the view that, in order to 
become attractive destinations for foreign investors, countries need to reinforce their 
infrastructure facilities, liberalise their local and global investment policies, improve the 
quality of governance institutions and reduce internal conflict and political risk. 
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1. Introduction 
Understanding what determines Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) remains a primary concern 
of economists and policy makers. However, the main determinants of FDI are still poorly 
understood because of the uncertainty and ambiguity surrounding both theories and empirical 
approaches to FDI. Formally, model uncertainty concerns the question of what variables to 
include in a regression. Economic theory often does not provide unambiguous guidance 
regarding the complete specification, and this is true for modelling FDI. Even when statistical 
tests are carried out the ambiguity may not be resolved. Thus several different models may all 
seem reasonable given the data (they have equal theoretical status) but generate different 
conclusions about the parameters of interest.
 1
 Various methods have been proposed to deal 
with this problem, including the use of Extreme Bounds Analysis (EBA) to determine which 
coefficients of the explanatory variables are robust determinants of the regression and which 
are fragile.  
 
EBA is a procedure theoretically developed by Leamer (1983, 1985) and Leamer and 
Leonard (1983) and applied, for example, by Levine and Renelt (1992) and Sala-i-Martin 
(1997) to provide robustness and sensitivity tests of explanatory variables when constructing 
econometric models
2
. This method facilitates the examination of which explanatory variables 
are robust determinants of a variable such as FDI. It is a relatively neutral way of coping with 
the problem of selecting variables for an empirical model in situations where there are 
conflicting or inconclusive suggestions. The EBA procedure allows the researcher to estimate 
a large number of regressions and check the robustness of a particular variable of interest by 
varying the subset of control variables and assessing whether the variable of interest and the 
dependent variable have a consistently strong correlation (with broadly the same sign). If this 
is deemed so, according to a particular criterion, the variable of interest’s coefficient is 
considered robust.
3
  
                                                   
1
 Presenting only the results of a single preferred model can be misleading, see Temple (2000).  
2
 Studies that have examined the robustness of coefficient estimates in the context of cross-country growth 
regressions include Levine and Renelt (1992), Sala-i-Martin (1997), Fernández et al. (2001), Hendry and 
Krolzig (2004), Sala-i-Martin et al. (2004), Hoover and Perez (2004) and Sturm and de Haan (2005). EBA has 
since spread to other fields of research such political economy and environment (Moser and Sturm 2011, 
Gassebner et al., 2012) and international finance (Levine, Loayza et al., 2000 and Levine 2003). 
3
 As pointed out by Temple (2000), robustness of a variable (in the sense that its significance does not depend 
on the choice of conditioning variables) is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for an interesting 
finding. Especially if causality is indirect (e.g. a variable affects investment or human capital), a finding that a 
variable is fragile in a growth model should be interpreted extremely carefully. Furthermore, a robust variable 
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This paper undertakes an exhaustive search for robust determinants of FDI by applying the 
Extreme Bound Analysis (EBA) technique in order to deal with model uncertainty. We use a 
large panel data set that covers 168 countries from 1970 to 2006 and consider a broad set of 
58 potential determinants of FDI that include economic, geographic and political variables; 
practically, all the variables that are suggested by previous literature. We employ two EBA 
methods that have been proposed as appropriate for isolating robust relationships (due to 
Leamer, 1983; Sala-i-Martin, 1997) that allow us to characterise these potential determinants 
as robust or fragile.  
 
We advance the literature on model uncertainty applied to the determinants of FDI in several 
ways. First, we use a larger sample and a more comprehensive set of variables than in 
previous work on FDI. In our selection of variables we attempt to utilise all of the theories of 
the determination of FDI, which we group into two categories: “economic” and 
“geopolitical” country characteristics. Second, we apply the two EBA tests using a panel data 
set (previous applications of EBA are typically applied in a cross section context). To our 
knowledge, the use of EBA to check the robustness of the determinants of FDI employing 
panel data has not been applied before. Indeed, the majority of applications of EBA are in the 
growth literature. Third, the study considers the possible endogeneity between FDI and the 
following three potential determinants: the current account balance, GDP growth and per-
capita GDP. Fourth, we employ two different panel data estimators in two separate 
applications of EBA. The first exclusively considers economic determinants and uses the 
fixed-effect estimator while the second considers both economic and geopolitical covariates, 
which can only be implemented using the random-effects estimator due to collinearity issues. 
The consideration of geopolitical variables in addition to economic determinants is a 
particularly noteworthy contribution of our paper.   
 
We show that more than half of the previously suggested FDI determinants are not robust. 
Our findings contradict some earlier results, but reaffirm the view that countries need to 
reinforce their infrastructure facilities and liberalise their local and global investment policies. 
Countries should focus on the quality of governance by building democratic institutions and 
reducing internal conflict and political risk in order to improve inward FDI performance and 
                                                                                                                                                              
may not be very interesting as robustness is defined in terms of significance of coefficients; yet a robust variable 
may be of little quantitative importance. Despite these qualifications, Temple (2000) goes on to argue, 
robustness would be a useful finding as it informs about the sensitivity of the results to alternative models. 
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become attractive destinations for foreign investors. The remainder of the paper is structured 
as follows. The next section reviews the relevant literature and outlines the EBA 
methodology. Section 3 discusses the data design and the variables to be used in each EBA 
application. The results are presented and discussed in section 4 while section 5 summarises 
and concludes the paper. 
 
2 Theoretical Considerations 
 
2.1 Motivating Extreme Bounds Analysis 
 
Cross-sectional studies of the inwards determinants of FDI are usually based on a regression 
that takes the following form: 
 
(
   
 
)
 
    ∑    
 
            (1) 
 
where (
   
 
)
 
 is  FDI inflows as a percentage of GDP into country i and     denotes the k
th
 
explanatory variable of country i. Many studies report a sample of regressions, using a certain 
set of explanatory variables
4
.  
 
The difficulty in formulating (1) is that theory (including the theory of FDI) is not adequately 
explicit about the variables that should appear in the “true” model; rather there is a long list 
of potential explanatory variables (the list of all variables that we consider is given in Tables 
                                                   
4
 “Economists are notorious for estimating 1000 regressions, throwing 999 in the bin and reporting the ‘best’ 
estimated model. This is typically the procedure used in the empirical studies of FDI due to the lack of a 
comprehensive theoretical model. True scientific research should be based on a quest for the truth. As a result of 
current practice, readers are left uninformed about the sensitivity of the results to small changes in the 
estimation set” (Moosa 2006). Gilbert (1986, p. 288) casts significant doubt on the validity of the practice of 
assigning 999 regressions to the waste bin because they do not produce the anticipated results. Because of this 
problem, Leamer (1983) suggested, “econometricians confine themselves to publishing mappings from prior to 
posterior distributions rather than actually making statements about the economy”. 
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1and 2). Conversely, numerous different models may all seem reasonable given the data, but 
yield different conclusions about the parameters of interest (see Sturm and de Haan, 2005). 
X1 may be significant when the regression includes X2 and X3, but not when X4 is included. 
The problem is to decide which combination of all available    s should be identified as the 
determinants of the dependent variable.  
 
Studies, especially in the growth literature, often restrict their analysis to certain subsets of 
the possible determinants and often ignore the effects of any omitted variable bias when other 
variables are not included. Others report the most “appealing” or convenient regression or 
regressions after extensive search and data mining and those that possibly confirm a 
preconceived idea. The results of these studies sometimes differ substantially. At the same 
time, most studies do not offer a careful sensitivity analysis to double check how robust their 
conclusions are with respect to model specification. As pointed out by Temple (2000), 
presenting only the results of the model preferred by the author can be misleading. Hussain 
and Brookins (2001) argue that: the usual practice of reporting a preferred model with its 
diagnostic tests (which is what was invariably done in previous studies of FDI) need not be 
sufficient to convey the degree of reliability of the determinants.  
 
The EBA procedure is designed to overcome this difficulty this: it enables the investigator to 
find upper and lower bounds for the parameter of interest from all possible combinations of 
potential explanatory variables. It does so by running many regressions, continuously 
permuting explanatory variables, and by assessing how the variable of interest “behaves” (for 
example, how often it is significant) with respect to the conditioning set, in order to ascertain 
the robustness of the determinants across various specifications. Among the advantages of 
EBA is that it provides a useful method for assessing and reporting the sensitivity of 
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estimated results to specification changes. As argued by Temple (2000), in empirical research 
it is rare that we can say with certainty that some model dominates all other possibilities in all 
dimensions. In these circumstances, it makes sense to provide information about how 
sensitive the findings are to alternative modelling choices.  EBA provides a relatively simple 
means of doing exactly this. Previous applications of this method in the literature have 
mainly been in the area of economic growth;
5
 its application in the context of the 
determinants of FDI is limited. As far as we are aware, only Chakrabarti (2001) and Moosa 
(2006) have used EBA to identify the robust determinants of FDI. 
 
Moosa (2006) has considered eight possible determining variables of FDI in his EBA 
analysis using a cross sectional sample of 136 countries between 1998 and 2000. With GDP 
growth serving as the only core variable, each of the remaining seven variables was 
considered (in turn) as the variable of interest (I), and combinations of three other variables 
are selected from the remaining six (the Z set), which leads to a total of 140 regressions (20 
regressions for each variable of interest). The results reveal three robust variables: exports as 
a percentage of GDP, telephone lines per 1000 of the population and country risk. In contrast, 
the variables GDP growth, commercial energy use, domestic investment and tertiary 
enrolments are found to be fragile. Moosa (2006) concludes that developed countries with 
large economies, a high degree of openness and low country risk tend to be more successful 
than others in attracting FDI. 
 
Chakrabarti’s (2001)  EBA analysis of the determinants of FDI used  data  involving  135 
countries for the year 1994 only and found that the 7 variables tested (namely, tax, wage, 
openness, exchange rate, tariff on imports, growth rate of GDP and the trade balance) appear 
                                                   
5
 See Sturm and de Haan (2005) for a further discussion. 
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to be fragile and highly sensitive to small alterations in the conditioning information set. Only 
the openness variable could possibly be regarded as robust as its Cumulative Distribution 
Function (CDF) evaluated at zero is 0.91. Chakrabarti (2001) attributes the lack of consensus 
upon determinants in the FDI literature to “the wide differences in perspectives, 
methodologies, sample-selection and analytical tools” used. 
 
This argument may explain the contradiction in results of previous applications of EBA to 
FDI (Chakrabarti 2001 and Moosa 2006) and our results. In our work we use a substantially 
larger panel data set and consider far more variables (168 countries over the sample period 
1970-2006 with 58 variables) than these previous applications of EBA to FDI. Further, these 
previous studies are smaller-sample cross-sectional data analyses whereas we employ a large 
panel data set. To estimate our model and test the robustness of various explanatory variables 
in determining FDI, we use the fixed-effects and random-effects estimators in a panel data 
context and apply (variants of) EBA as suggested by Leamer (1983) and developed by Levine 
and Renelt (1992) and Sala-i-Martin (1996 and 1997).
6
  
 
2.2 Modelling Approach: 
 
A widely employed means of conducting EBA is to divide the variables into four groups, as 
expressed in equation (2). For each country i, and each specific regression jk (where j[1,M], 
k[1,K] as specified below), we have:  
 
                                                   
6
 We apply the fixed-effects estimator when considering only economic variables and the random-effects 
estimator when political and geographical variables are included in the analysis. The fixed-effects estimator 
cannot be used in the latter case since many of the geographical and political variables are perfectly 
multicollinear with the fixed effects. The error term for the general two-way estimator may be decomposed as 
follows:                      where        (     
 ),       (     
 ) and         (     
 ). 
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(
   
 
)
  
                            
         (2)  
 
The first is the dependent variable (in our case, the FDI/GDP ratio) and the second is the n 
standard core explanatory variables that are included in every single regression (in addition to 
a constant) denoted      (             ) , where,     (          )
 . 
Following Levine and Renelt (1992), we use a set of exactly three core variables,     , that are 
always kept in the equation. The third is     , which is the k
th
 single variable of interest whose 
robustness we are testing and is a single variable selected from the set of variables    where 
the latter is a Kx1 vector containing all of the possible determinants of FDI that are not 
included in     . Following Leamer (1983), we consider all of the remaining variables in     
(one at a time and each in turn) as     .     is identified from a wide range of past studies as 
including potentially important candidate determinants (beyond     ) that need to be 
controlled for in FDI regressions. The fourth is     
 , which is a 3x1 vector of exactly three 
additional control variables chosen from the pool of possible (non-core) explanatory 
variables,    , that do not include k.  For each k, all the possible combinations of the 
remaining K-1 variables in the predetermined pool of variables     is considered; there are 
  [ 
(   ) 
(     )    
] such combinations. Further j=1,2,….M, where j denotes the jth estimated 
combination of the variables: the j
th
 model. The robustness of each variable of interest,     , is 
tested while controlling for      and all the possible combinations     
 .
7
 Exactly three 
variables are included in     
 , partly to follow Sala-i-Martin’s (1997) original methodology.8 
                                                   
7
 We apply EBA with an intercept, the variable of interest,     , the same three core variables in all regressions, 
    , and allowing the     
  variables to come in combinations of exactly three, giving seven explanatory variables 
plus an intercept in all estimated models. This follows almost all of the growth literature where at least seven 
explanatory variables are included in reported models. Fixing the number of regressors that appear in each 
regression has a direct effect on the size of the estimated coefficients (see Leon Gonzalez and Montolio, 2003) 
and it limits the number of the models that are explored.   
8
 Levine and Renelt (1992) allow the     
  variables to be combined in sets of up to three variables.  
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It is also because we want to tie our hands as tightly as possible in the regression 
specification process in order to avoid the perception of data mining or selective reporting of 
results. There are M possible combinations for each of the k=1,2,…,K variables of interest, 
giving a total of     possible regressions. Finally,     is an error term. The aim is to 
investigate the effects on the statistical significance of    , the coefficient on the k
th
 variable 
of interest, when varying the combinations of three variables included in     
 .
9
  
 
The (        )  estimated coefficients for each     ,  ̂  , and     ,  ̂  , are recorded. The 
standard deviation of these   coefficient estimates is calculated for the each      and is 
denoted as  ̂ . The highest and lowest values of  ̂   are represented by  ̂ 
    and  ̂ 
   , 
respectively. The “extreme bounds" are defined as in Leamer (1983), where the lower 
extreme bound (   ) and upper extreme bound (   ) are calculated using: 
 
     ̂ 
      ̂           (3) 
 
     ̂ 
      ̂   (4) 
 
Clearly, LEB<UEB and these values form a range within which the true coefficient lies. 
According to Leamer (1983, 1985), the variable      is a “robust” determinant of the 
dependent variable if the extreme bounds (    and    ) are of the same sign; whereas, if 
                                                   
9
 To give the results more credibility, Levine and Renelt (1992) restrict their EBA in three ways. First, they use 
three     
  variables only, hence restricting the number of explanatory variables in each equation. Second, they 
choose a small pool of variables from which the three     
  variables are chosen. Third, for every variable of 
interest, they restrict the pool of variables from which the     
  variables are chosen by excluding variables that, a 
priori, might measure the same phenomenon (ensuring that there are no close substitutes). They argue that these 
restrictions make it more difficult to endogenously obtain fragile results. We also apply the first and third of 
these restrictions, however, we do not apply the second because we believe that the large pool of economic and 
geopolitical variables,     
 , that we draw      from, is a strength of our paper.  
  
 
10 
 
 
    and     have different signs,       is described as having a “fragile” relationship with 
the dependent variable. The rationale is that if    <0<   , zero is included in the implied 
confidence interval, so it cannot be said with confidence that the true coefficient differs from 
it. In the latter case, changes in the conditioning information set change the statistical 
inferences that can be drawn regarding the relationship between      and the dependent 
variable. 
10
 
  
Leamer and Leonard (1983) argue that the extreme values  ̂ 
   and  ̂ 
    delineate the 
ambiguity in the inferences about     induced by the ambiguity in choice of model. If the 
difference between   ̂ 
   and  ̂ 
    is small in comparison to the sampling uncertainty, the 
ambiguity in the model may be considered irrelevant since all models lead to essentially the 
same inferences (see, for example, Leamer and Leonard, 1983, p. 307). McAleer et al. (1985) 
criticise the EBA approach; they argue that it provides a reporting style that is not better than 
the conventional procedure because it replaces (arbitrary) regression selection with (arbitrary) 
variable partition. Levine and Renelt (1992, p. 945) suggest that the McAleer et al. (1985) 
problem may be addressed by showing that changes in the      variables do not alter the 
overall conclusions. In our first application of the EBA procedure, we test all possible 
variables considered in both      and     for robustness. Further, we consider two different 
sets of      variables in our two EBA applications.  
 
Sala-i-Martin (1997) argues that Leamer’s EBA testing criterion is too restrictive for any 
variables to realistically pass it. If the distribution of the parameter of interest has some 
positive and some negative values, then a researcher is bound to find at least one regression 
                                                   
10
 Exactly the same procedure is applied to (and statistics calculated for) the coefficient estimates  ̂   ; however, 
for brevity of exposition, we only discuss the statistics associated with the EBA procedure within the context of 
 ̂  . These results are available from the authors on request.  
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for which the estimated coefficient changes sign if enough regressions are run. In other 
words, under this test a variable is considered “fragile” if only one regression out of many 
thousands causes a change in the sign of a coefficient. He noted that if one keeps trying 
different combinations of control variables included in the samples drawn within some error 
from the true population, then one is virtually guaranteed to find a model for which the 
coefficient of interest becomes insignificant or even changes sign. As a result, one may 
conclude that no variables are robust or that the test of robustness is extremely difficult to 
pass. 
 
Sala-i-Martin (1997) proposes an alternative form of EBA to determine a variable’s 
robustness, derived from Leamer’s (1983) methodology and using essentially the same model 
as specified in equation (2). However, his approach differs in the way the extreme bounds of 
     are calculated. His determination of robustness is based on the fraction of the Cumulative 
Distribution Function (CDF) of  ̂   that lies to the right of zero (using the entire distribution 
of the estimated coefficients). If this fraction is sufficiently large (small) for a positive 
(negative) relationship,      is regarded as robust. Sala-i-Martin argues that if at least 90% of 
the CDF for  ̂   lies on either side of zero, it is probably safe to conclude that      is robust. 
Sala-i-Martin’s criterion is more lenient than Leamer’s and increases the likelihood that a 
variable is robust. This discussion illustrates that there is no uniform definition of 
robustness.
11
 We regard a variable as robust if it passes either Leamer’s or Sala-i-Martin’s 
EBA criteria.   
                                                   
11
 This is explicitly recognised in Florax et al. (2002), who consider a range of definitions of robustness. They 
analyse the sign, size and significance of regression results. This analysis extends Levine and Renelt and Sala-i-
Martin’s work by not only considering a wide range of robustness definitions but also explicitly analysing the 
robustness of the sizes of the estimated effects. The robustness criteria adopted by Levine and Renelt and Sala-i-
Martin focus mainly on statistical significance. Whether the estimated effect sizes are robust to changes in the 
conditioning set of variables is hardly addressed. We refer here to McCloskey and Ziliak (1996), for a pervasive 
critique on this practice in economics. To assess robustness along this dimension, Florax et al. (2002) extend the 
definition of robustness by requiring that the average estimated effect sizes conditional upon the inclusion of a 
particular variable are within predetermined bounds from the overall average estimated effect size.  
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We apply two variants of Sala-i-Martin’s (1997) EBA, being the normal and non-normal 
CDF methods. We discuss both below.  
 
2.2.1: Sala-i-Martin’s EBA with normally distributed     across models 
 
Sala-i-Martin’s method involves the calculation of a CDF for each variable of interest,     , 
using the (        )  estimated coefficients,  ̂  , estimated coefficient variances,  ̂  
 , and 
integrated likelihood of the j
th
 model,    . Using these values the mean of  ̂   (denoted  ̅ ) is 
constructed as the weighted average of each of the M  ̂  , that is:
 12
  
 
 ̅  ∑     ̂  
 
      (5) 
 
where the weights,   , are proportional to the (integrated) likelihoods, thus: 
 
    
   
∑    
 
   
  (6) 
   
This weighting scheme is used to give more weight to the models that are most likely to be 
considered the true model.
13
  
 
Similarly, the average of the coefficient variances, denoted  ̅ 
 , is calculated as the weighted 
average of the M  ̂  
 , thus:  
                                                   
12
 We are careful to exclude regressions where the regressions do not estimate and the coefficients are reported 
as zero. 
13
 Another criticism of Leamer’s method is that it weights all model specifications equally, so that divergent 
coefficient estimates from a poorly specified equation can be sufficient to disqualify a variable as “robust”.  
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 ̅ 
   ∑     ̂  
  
     (7) 
 
Using (5) and (7) the average t-ratio for the k
th
 variable,  ̅ , can be calculated as: 
 ̅  
 ̅ 
 ̅ 
  (8) 
 
Assuming the     have a standard normal distribution across the M models, the CDF is 
calculated as  ( ̅  ), where   denotes the cumulative density based on the standard normal 
distribution. Finally, the    ( ) statistics indicates the larger of the areas under the density 
function either side of zero [hence        ( )   ], that is: 
 
   ( )   ( ̅  )    ( ̅  )     
   ( )     ( ̅  )    ( ̅  )     
}   (9) 
 
Note that in our application, because we cannot estimate the M models over the same sample 
period, we do not attach different weights to different models’ parameters. That is, we 
effectively set    
 
 
 in (6).
14
 
 
 
 
                                                   
14
 We use the unweighted, instead of weighted,    ( ) mainly because of a missing data problem. The number 
of observations used to estimate each equation changes depending on which variables are included in each 
regression. Thus, the dataset is not identical over all combinations of variables (our data set is an unbalanced 
panel), and the integrated likelihood will not simply reflect the model’s fit it will also vary with the sample size 
making it inappropriate to use as a weight in our application. Sala-i-Martin (1997) gives another reason for 
using the unweighted    ( )  being that the integrated likelihood might not be a good indicator of the 
probability that a model is the true model. Furthermore, for technical reasons, in particular our unbalanced panel 
setup, we are unable to use the extension of this approach called Bayesian Averaging of Classical Estimates 
(BACE) as introduced by Sala-i-Martin et al. (2004). 
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2.2.2: Sala-i-Martin’s EBA with non-normally distributed     across models 
 
According to Sala-i-Martin (1997), if the     are not normally distributed across the M 
models for any particular k,    ( ) can be calculated using the individual CDFs for each of 
the M regressions. The CDF for the j
th
 regression is denoted as: 
 
   ( |  ̂    ̂  
 )   (    )  (10) 
 
where     
 ̂  
√ ̂  
 
, and: 
 
  ( |  ̂    ̂  
 )    ( |  ̂    ̂  
 )     ( |  ̂    ̂  
 )     
  ( |  ̂    ̂  
 )      ( |  ̂    ̂  
 )     ( |  ̂    ̂  
 )     
}   (11) 
 
The aggregate “non-normal” CDF, denoted    ( ) , is calculated as the weighted average of 
the (        )  individual CDFs, where the weights are given by (6), which we set to 
    
 
 
, thus:
 
 
   ( )  ∑      ( |  ̂    ̂  
 )     
 
 
∑   ( |  ̂    ̂  
 )      (12) 
 
Variables are regarded as robust when both CDFs are at least 0.90. The degree of robustness 
is assigned as follows: robust at the 1% level when    ( )       or    ( )       
(which is denoted with ***), robust at the 5% level when either          (**), robust at 
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the 10% level when either          (*).15 We also identify a variable as a “possible” 
determinant when both    s are at least 0.80 (and both are not greater than 0.89) and as a 
“fragile” determinant otherwise.  
 
3. Estimation Methodology 
 
3.1. Data 
 
In order to assess the determinants of FDI, we have assembled a large panel dataset with an 
extensive list of potential explanatory factors. These factors were chosen using theories of the 
determinants of FDI and previous empirical studies on the determinants of FDI.
 16
 The 
definitions and sources of the variables used are given in Table 1 and Table 2. Data were 
constructed from a number of data sources, including World Development Indicators 2006 
(denoted WDI in the tables). The political and institutional variables are obtained from the 
International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) and we construct the geographical dummy 
variables. Our sample is an unbalanced annual panel dataset consisting of 58 economic, 
political and geographical variables for 168 economies over the period 1970–2006, which 
gives a (maximum) total of 6048 observations. As far as we are aware no previous study of 
FDI has covered such a long period with such a large number of economic, geographical and 
political variables.  
 
[Insert Table 1] 
 
                                                   
15
 We take 0.90 as the posterior probability threshold following Sala-i-Martin (1997) and Fernandez et al. 
(2001) who label a regressor that obtains a posterior probability that is equal to or greater than 0.90 as robust. 
16
 See Chakrabarti (2001, Table 1)  for a detailed discussion of empirical findings on the determinants of FDI. 
Table 1 in his paper indicates how ambiguous the evidence is. 
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[Insert Table 2] 
 
The sample period covered is determined by the availability of the data. The sample size 
varies for different regressions estimated in the EBA procedure due the availability of data 
being different for the different combinations of variables included in a particular regression.  
 
3.2. Estimation issues  
 
Since the fixed-effects estimator does not assume that effects are uncorrelated with the error 
term while the random-effects estimator does, it is far more likely that the strict exogeneity 
assumption will be violated with the latter than the former method. Hence, the fixed-effects 
estimator is more likely to ensure consistent estimates in our numerous EBA regressions than 
the random-effects estimator and its use is therefore favoured a priori.
17
 For this reason our 
first application of EBA that considers only economic determinants employs the fixed-effects 
estimator in all regressions. 
 
However, when political and geographical variables are added to the analysis, we can only 
estimate the models using the random-effects estimator because some of these variables will 
be perfectly collinear with the (cross-sectional) fixed effects. For example, our geographical 
covariates include dummy variables for five different regions; these variables only vary 
across sections and not through time – see Table 2 for the regions considered. Hence the 
random-effects estimator is employed in our second application of EBA that incorporates 
economic, geographical and political variables. 
 
                                                   
17
 Application of the Hausman test and F-test in initial modelling suggested the use of the fixed-effects estimator 
when only time–variant (economic) variables are included as determinants. 
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To obtain a satisfactory econometric model we have to consider the issue of endogeneity. 
When explanatory variables are endogenous, ordinary least squares (OLS) gives biased and 
inconsistent estimates of the causal effect of an explanatory variable on the dependent 
variable. We identify three potential determinants as being the most likely to be 
endogenously determined with FDI as the current account balance (CAB), GDP growth 
(GDPG) and per-capita GDP (GDPP).
 18
 
 
Temple (1999) argues that there exists a robust correlation between investment and growth 
and empirically a number of studies have shown that causality runs from growth to 
investment and vice versa.
19
 Hence FDI may determine growth. For example, FDI may affect 
economic growth directly because it contributes to capital accumulation and the transfer of 
new technologies to the recipient country. In addition, FDI enhances economic growth 
indirectly where the direct transfer of technology augments the stock of knowledge in the 
recipient country through labour training and skill acquisition, new management practices 
and organizational arrangements (Blomstrom et al., 1994; Barro and Lee, 2001; and Sala-i- 
Martin, 1996).  
 
                                                   
18
 To consider the presence of endogeneity we apply the Wu-Hausman test. The Wu-Hausman tests are based 
upon a fixed-effects estimated example regression of (
   
 
) on the 6 covariates CAB, GDPG, GDPP, OPEN, 
INFL, TTRADE and the 3 residual series from the reduced form instrument equations for the 3 potentially 
endogenous variables CAB, GDPG and GDPP. The reduced form instrument equations are fixed-effects 
regressions of each of the 3 potentially endogenous variables on the 7 (presumed) weakly exogenous covariates 
OPEN, INFL, TTRADE, CGD, RATIOT, GS and GCF. The results of these tests are available upon request. 
The probability value for the Wu-Hausman F-statistic for testing the joint exclusion of the three residual series is 
0.0822. This means that the three variables are jointly weakly exogenous at the 5% level although they are not 
jointly weakly exogenous at the 10 % level. The 3 Wu-Hausman t-tests indicates that CAB is not weakly 
exogenous (the t-ratio is –2.253) while GDPG (–0.413) and GDP (–0.604) are weakly exogenous. Hence, there 
is some evidence that weak exogeneity is violated for all three variables jointly (at the 10% level) and CAB 
individually. We are also concerned that our instrument equation for GDPG may be weak which may affect the 
results from the Wu- Hausman test (the F-statistics of the fixed-effects instrument regressions are 14.418 for the 
CAB equation, 279.070 for GDPG and 5.125 for GDPG which are all significant at the 5% level). Given that 
there are reasons to believe that these three variables are potentially endogenous these example results suggest 
that we should not assume that these variables are weakly exogenous. 
19
 See also Bhattarai, K. and Ghatak, S. (2010) for a discussion on the link between GDP and FDI in OECD 
countries.   
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Mencinger (2008) highlights three indirect effects of FDI on the current account balance as 
follows. First, if FDI increases capital formation without crowding out domestically financed 
investment, it worsens the current account by the same amount. Second, if FDI crowds out 
domestically financed investment, the effects depend on the reduction of domestically 
financed investment; a part of FDI can be used to finance existing indebtedness of the 
country. Third, if FDI implies acquisition of the existing assets in the host country, FDI 
provides a source of financing of the existing current account deficit. 
 
We therefore treat CAB, GDPG and GDPP as endogenous in our EBA applications because 
the costs of incorrectly treating exogenous variables as endogenous are much lower than 
incorrectly assuming endogenous variables are exogenous. This means that these three 
variables are excluded from     and     in all EBA applications and are only considered as 
     variables. Hence, the only inference that could be affected by endogeneity bias is when 
these covariates are considered as the variable of interest. 
 
4. Econometric Results  
 
This section presents and discusses the results of our robustness analyses using EBA. The 
empirical results are presented in two subsections. In section 4.1 we discuss the results of the 
EBA applied only to economic variables whereas section 4.2 discusses the EBA application 
involving economic, political and geographical variables. 
 
4.1. EBA using only economic variables  
 
The 30 potential economic determinants of FDI that we consider in our first EBA application 
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are listed in Table 1. The following three core variables,     , that are always kept in the 
equation are: openness (denoted Open), inflation (Infl), and tax on trade (Ttrade). These core 
variables are chosen because they have been shown to be robustly linked to FDI in previous 
empirical work (as well as in our initial experiments) and we do not expect them to be 
endogenous. All of the remaining 27 economic determinants are considered as the variable of 
interest,     , however only 24 of these are included in     
  because we are seeking to 
minimise the impact of any endogeneity bias that the current account balance (CAB), GDP 
growth (GDPG) and per-capita GDP (GDPP) variables may cause.
20
  
 
Tables 3 to 6 summarise the results of our first EBA application. The first column reports the 
variable of interest under consideration. For each      variable four sets of EBA statistics are 
reported: one set for the      variable (reported in Table 6) and one set for each of the 3 core 
variables: Open (Table 3), Infl (Table 4) and Ttrade (Table 5).
21
 The column headed “Obs” 
gives the number of regressions estimated for each     .
22
 This is below the maximum number 
of possible regressions and this is mainly due to insufficient observations preventing the 
                                                   
20
 We note that in our first EBA application the variables in     have pairwise correlation coefficients that are (in 
all cases) below 0.5 in magnitude. This should limit the problem of multicollinearity which can adversely affect 
conclusions regarding robustness.  
21
 In Tables 3 – 5 each core variable is tested for robustness with the test results specified in a disaggregated 
form for each of the non-core variables. In contrast, Table 6 assess the robustness of the non-core variables of 
interest,     . 
22
 Assuming that all models contain the same number of variables in     
 , p, the total possible number of 
regressions for any particular      is:   
(   ) 
(     )    
, where the (   )  arises because the      variable is 
removed from the set of   variables in     from which the various combinations of p=3 variables in      are 
taken. For all      in a whole EBA application the total number of regression is    . Because we exclude 3 
potentially endogenous variables from     this implies that   (     )     for these 24 “non-endogenous” 
variables’ applications of EBA. Hence, the number of regressions for each of these 24 variables is (  
(    ) 
(      )    
 )     and the total for all 24 variables is (        )       . Whereas, for the three 
potentailly endogenous variables we only exclude the other 2 potentially endogenous variables from their EBA 
applications, hence   (     )    . Thus, for each potentially endogenous variable the number of estimated 
regressions is (  
(    ) 
(      )    
 )     and so for all 3 of these variables the total is (       )     . 
Hence, the maximum number of regressions estimated in the first EBA application is 
(           )      . Because some models do not estimate due to, for example, insufficient 
observations, the actual number of estimated models in the EBA application is below this. 
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estimation of some models. This causes some variation in the number of regressions run for 
the different     . 
 
[Insert Table 3] 
 
[Insert Table 4] 
 
[Insert Table 5] 
 
[Insert Table 6] 
 
The column headed “AVG coeft” gives the variable’s coefficient averaged over the number 
regressions (Obs) used in the EBA application. Also reported in the tables are the averaged 
coefficient standard error (“AVG S.E.”) and absolute t-ratio (“AVG T”).23  The columns 
headed         and       give Leamer’s lower and upper bounds, respectively.24  Sala-i-
Martin’s (1997) non-normal CDF [denoted    ( ) ] and normal CDF [   ( )] statistics are 
also reported in the tables.
25
 The final column (“robustness”) indicates whether a variable is 
robust (and its degree of robustness), possibly robust or fragile, based upon Sala-i-Martin’s 
criteria. For a variable to be robust it must have a CDF of at least 0.90 according to both 
normal and non-normal criteria (the normal and non-normal CDF broadly yield the same 
inference). Similarly a variable is a possible determinant if both CDF criteria are at least 0.80 
(and the variable is not regarded as robust), otherwise the variable is said to be fragile. 
                                                   
23
 Note that AVG T is not equivalent to (8). This is because (8) averages the numerator and denominator of the 
t-ratio before applying the division whereas AVG T divides the numerator by the denominator first and then 
averages the result. 
24
 These are calculated using (3) and (4). 
25
 These are calculated using (12) and (9). 
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The first inference we draw from Table 3 – 6 is that none of the 27 variables are robust 
according to Leamer’s (1983) criterion because     and     have different signs in all 
cases. This likely reflects the overly stringent nature of this criterion and we therefore do not 
base our conclusions upon it. 
 
However, variables are robust according to Sala-i-Martin’s (1997) CDF criteria. Table 3 
indicates that the core variable, Open, is robust in 26 out of 27 sets of EBA results (the 
exception is when Timeb is the variable of interest). This result is consistent with many 
previous studies that found openness toward trade to be a significant determinant of FDI as it  
provides funds for economic expansion (see Chakrabarti, 2001 and Moosa, 2006). In all 27 
cases Open has an average coefficient sign (see the column headed “AVG coeft”) that is 
positive which is consistent with theoretical expectations. In contrast, the Infl core variable is 
robust in only one (Ratiot) of the 27 EBA sets – see Table 4. Infl is a “possible” determinant 
for 3 variables of interest (Internet, Liquid and Timeb) because both of their CDFs are 
between 0.80 and 0.89 and is a fragile determinant for the remaining 23     . The Ttrade core 
variable is robust in only one (Cgd) of the 27 EBA sets and is a “possible” determinant for 3 
variables (REX, TEL and UNEM), see Table 5. Hence, we consider this as strong evidence 
against Ttrade and Infl being robust determinants of FDI. 
 
From Table 6 we see that eight non-core variables are unambiguously robust determinants of 
FDI according to Sala-i-Martin’s criteria because both of their CDFs exceed 0.90. These are 
CAB, GDPG, GDPP, Hmtaxcor, FDIO, Ratiot, Ratios and GFE. Four variables, (Wgetogdpl, 
GCF, TEL and Taxprofr) are considered “possible” determinants because both their CDFs are 
at least 0.80 and do not exceed 0.89. All of the other variables in our first EBA application 
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are fragile.  Comparing our findings with previous applications of EBA to FDI using EBA 
(that considered far fewer potential determinants than we do) provides interesting insights. 
Moosa (2006) found telephone mainlines to be robust whereas we find it to be fragile. 
Further, Moosa found GDP growth and tertiary enrolments to be fragile while we find these 
variables to be robust. Chakrabarti (2001) found openness and GDP to be robust as we do. 
Hence, whilst previous studies provide some inferences that are consistent with our results 
many are not consistent. We believe that our results are more reliable due to the greater 
coverage of data, sample size and larger number of potential determinants considered. 
 
We now discuss the variables that we find to be robust and “possible” determinants in more 
detail. The robust Hmtaxcor variable combines the effects of corporate taxes on FDI with 
very high levels of profitability and effects on marginal investments which determine the 
volume of an existing capital stock. The effect of Hmtaxcor on FDI is expected to be negative 
because a multinational corporation (MNC) will decide to invest where tax on marginal profit 
is lower compared to alternative locations. As expected Hmtaxcor has a generally negative 
sign (indicated by the “AVG coeft” statistic) as a higher Hmtaxcor implies a lower level of 
after tax profits. Our results suggest that a host country with high corporate taxes will have a 
robust negative effect on FDI.
26
  
 
FDI outflows (FDIO) is another robust determinant of FDI inflows. Increased 
competitiveness is one of the prime benefits that a developing country’s MNCs can derive 
from their FDI outflow activities. We find that FDIO generally has a positive impact on FDI 
which is consistent with theoretical expectations.  
                                                   
26
 Recently Becker et al (2012) stated that the quantity of FDI is affected if corporate taxes reduce the 
equilibrium stock of foreign capital in a given country, while quality effects arise if taxes decrease the extent to 
which investment contributes to the corporate tax base and capital intensity of production. 
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The tertiary enrolment ratio (Ratiot) and secondary enrolment ratio (Ratios) are both found to 
be robust determinants of FDI and represent those factors that capture the impact of labor 
productivity and wage rates on FDI. Theory suggests a clear-cut sign for these coefficients 
(positive), as human capital is generally considered a prime driver of productivity and 
investment; FDI should be no exception here. Indeed, we find that both Ratios and Ratiot 
have generally positive coefficients which are consistent with theoretical expectations and 
implies that education attracts vertical FDI.
27
 
 
Government expenditure as a proportion of GDP (GFE) is robust and has, on average, a 
negative sign, as is theoretically expected. The reason for this negative relationship as 
suggested by Onyeiwu (2003) and Filipovic (2005) is that a large size of the government may 
create opportunities for misuse of funds by government officials, crowd-out private 
investment (including FDI) and creates an elaborate and complex bureaucratic structure that 
makes the investment climate unattractive to FDI as it may increase future taxation. 
 
Theory suggests that an increase in GDPG and GDPP leads to an increase in FDI. For 
example, higher GDPP indicates greater aggregate income and or more companies, and 
therefore a higher ability to invest abroad, while smaller GDPP in host country implies 
limited market size and a consequent desire by companies to expand their operations overseas 
in order to gain market share. We find that both GDP variables are robust and have generally 
                                                   
27
 The hypothesis that human capital in host countries is a determinant of FDI has been embodied in the 
theoretical literature. For example, Lucas (1993) conjectures that lack of human capital discouraged foreign 
investment in less-developed countries. Zhang and Markusen (1999) present a model where the availability of 
skilled labor in the host country is a direct requirement of MNCs and affects the volume of FDI inflows. 
Dunning (1988) maintains that the skill and education level of labor can influence both the volume of FDI 
inflows and the activities that MNCs undertake in a country. Noorbakhsh et al. (2001) concluded that human 
capital plays an increasingly important role over time in attracting FDI. Further, the educational level and skills 
of workers affect their productivity. Indeed the level of human capital increases the ability of workers to learn 
and adopt new technologies faster and more efficiently and thus boost up the productivity of the sector. 
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positive coefficient signs, which is consistent with theoretical expectations. 
 
Next, we find that the current account balance (CAB) affects FDI with an overall negative 
sign. This is consistent with theory, as from National Income Accounting we have CA=S-I, in 
obvious notation.
28
 Thus, if incoming FDI augments total domestic investment and does not 
simply crowd out indigenous investment one-for-one (an extreme outcome), I increases with 
FDI. If the marginal propensity to save is between zero and one, as is plausible, then S will 
rise but by a smaller amount. Thus, CA will fall.  
 
We now discuss the 4 determinants (Gcf, TEL, Wgetogdpl and Taxprofr) that we find to be 
“possibly” robust in more detail. Gross Fixed Capital Formation (Gcf) is total domestic 
investment, so, following the above reasoning, there will be a positive relation with FDI 
except in the extreme and unlikely situation where foreign investment entirely crowds out the 
indigenous one. We find a generally positive relationship which is consistent with this 
theoretical expectation. The number of telephones per 1000 inhabitants (TEL) is a standard 
proxy of infrastructure development in the literature. An established and advanced 
infrastructure facility of the host country provides a great platform for investment and leads 
to greater FDI (a positive coefficient is expected). Our results indicate a generally positive 
coefficient for this variable which is consistent with theoretical expectations. However, the 
wage-GDP ratio (Wgetogdpl) has, on average, a positive coefficient which is theoretically 
unexpected. Having said this, Charkrabarti (2001) argues that using the wage to proxy labour 
costs as a determinant of FDI is contentious. There is no unanimity in the previous studies 
regarding the role of wages in attracting FDI. ODI (1997) suggests that empirical research 
has found the wage to be statistically significant for foreign investment in labour-intensive 
                                                   
28
 To see this, we can start from basics : GNP=C+I+G+CA, therefore GNP-C-G=I+CA, therefore CA=S-I, 
where S is national saving (private + public).   
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industries and for export–oriented subsidiaries. However, when the cost of labour varies little 
from one country to another, it is the skills of the labour force that are expected to have an 
impact on decisions about FDI location. 
 
Tax on profit (Taxprofr) is our last “possible” economic determinant of FDI. One potential 
explanation is linked to whether the parent multinational company (MNC) is export oriented, 
in which case it may view taxes as highly influential in its investment decisions, while a retail 
MNC seeking specific advantages from the domestic market may prioritise factors other than 
tax. Our finding is in line with Morisset’s (2003) statement that, “the effectiveness of tax 
incentives is likely to vary depending on a firm’s activity and its motivations for investing 
abroad”. Another possible justification of Taxprofr being a “possible” determinant is an 
increase in profit shifting opportunities (or costs) from one host country to another is a 
strategy of MNCs to reduce the tax rate. Genschel (2001) suggests that MNCs that undertake 
production activities face in general high transactions cost and profit-shifting is almost 
prohibitive so that locational advantages such as tax on profit become an important 
determinant. However MNCs that invest in services, finance and R&D face relatively low 
costs when shifting profits and hence real activity plays only a small role in determining 
investment decisions. We find that Taxprofr typically has a negative coefficient which is 
consistent with our theoretical expectations. 
 
Of these 9 robust, and 4 possibly robust, variables (Open, GFE, FDIO, Tel, Ratios, Ratiot, 
Cab, GDPG, GDPP, Hmtaxcor, Taxprofr, Gcf, Wgetogdpl), 12 have theoretically expected 
(average) coefficient signs. However, the possibly robust Wgetogdpl variable has a 
theoretically unexpected average coefficient sign. However, we treat the finding of 
robustness for the three potentially endogenous variables Cab, GDPG and GDPP with caution 
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and hesitate to conclude that our results offer strong support for their robustness. 
 
4.2. EBA using economic, geographical and political variables   
 
In our second EBA application we include Open, Gfe and Ratios as our core variables 
following the results of our first EBA. Open is chosen because it is the only core variable 
from our first EBA application that is robust. Since the other two core variables (Infl and 
Ttrade) are not robust in our first EBA application we seek two different core variables for 
our second EBA application. The criteria used to select these two core variables are those 
robust variables with an average coefficient sign that is consistent with theoretical 
expectations in the first EBA application that have the highest value for    ( )  and are not 
one of the 3 potentially endogenous variables. The 3 variables with the highest values for 
   ( )  are Gfe (   ( )      ), Ratios (0.95) and Cab (0.95). Since we regard Cab as 
potentially endogenous we select the other 2 as core variables, along with Open, to be 
employed in our second EBA application. Our first EBA application arguably suggests that 
these are the most likely economic variables to be robust. 
 
We add 28 geographical and political variables (Table 2) to the economic variables to be 
considered in the second EBA application allowing us to test the robustness of an extended 
set of variables. The geopolitical variables are not included in the core set of variables,    , or 
the set of three     
  variables (to help avoid multicollinearity), however, they are all 
considered (in turn) as the variable of interest,     . All of the economic variables (except the 
3 core variables) are considered (in turn) as      and in     
  (except for the potentially 
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endogenous variables, Cab, GDPG and GDPP, and the 3 core variables).
29
  
 
In this second application, based on the institutional quality hypothesis by North (1990) that 
highlight the relationship between FDI and political institutions we are trying to determine 
whether country specific institutions (such as democracy, corruption, bureaucracy and 
conflict), cultural factors (languages) or geographical locations (number of boundaries, costal 
location, abundance of natural resources, proximity to particular regions) can influence FDI. 
Many geographical and political/institutional factors have been conclusively linked to 
economic growth (see e.g. Durlauf et al., 2005) and remain active areas of research. The 
results of our second EBA application are reported in Table 7 and for economic variables and 
in Table 8 for geopolitical variables. As before, none of the 55 variables are robust according 
to Leamer’s (1983) criterion because     and     have different signs in all cases; again, 
due to the overly stringent nature of this criterion, we do not base our conclusions upon it. 
 
According to both of Sala-i-Martin’s (1997) CDF criteria, only 10 of the 28 geopolitical 
variables are considered as robust determinants of FDI as both of their CDFs are at least 0.90. 
These include the dummies for: countries in the South Asia region (SA), countries in the East 
Asia and pacific region (EAP), countries with more than 3 boundaries (GTBUN), countries 
that are not land-locked (landunlocked), Spanish (SPN) and Arabic speaking countries (ARB) 
as well as nations with greater democratic accountability (DEMO). These seven determinants 
are all generally positively correlated with FDI inflows. The other three robust geopolitical 
                                                   
29
 For the EBA involving the 24 (not potentially endogenous) economic and 28 geopolitical variables the 
(maximum) number of estimated models (with K=24 variables in     
 ) for each variable of interest is (  
(    ) 
(      )    
 )    , giving a total of  {[(24+28) * 1771]=} 92092  regressions. For the 3 endogenous variables 
the (maximum) total number of regressions is (       )      – see calculations above. Hence, the 
maximum number of regressions estimated in this second EBA application is 98164. Thus, in the two EBA 
applications, we estimated  (98164+48576=) 146740  models. 
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variables are dummies for: countries experiencing low international and internal conflict 
(conflictint) and economies with an abundance of the natural resources: oil (oildummy) and 
gas (gasdummy).  
  
[Insert Table 7] 
 
The results indicate regional effects such that the South Asia and EAP regions receive 
relatively high FDI after controlling for other factors. This is consistent with the empirical 
evidence that South Asia countries received the largest share of FDI. Vial (2002) suggested 
many reasons behind the increase of FDI to this particular region such as the change in the 
political climate and the receptivity towards foreign capital. Further, the process of reforms 
through which these countries have gone through and the new business climate in natural 
resource sectors may also explain the increase in FDI in this region. Other possible 
explanation is the geographic proximity of this region to China.
30
  
 
SA and EAP regions have captured most of the increased investment. These regions include 
economies which offer the best climate for doing business. The development experiences of 
EAP countries such China, Singapore, Hong Kong and Taiwan emerged as locations offering 
distinct hubs of labour-intensive exports owing to low labour costs. 
 
Democracy can increase FDI inflows because they provide checks and balances on elected 
officials, and this in turn reduces arbitrary government intervention, increases information 
and transparency, lowers the risk of policy reversal and strengthens property right protection 
                                                   
30
 Our results also show that the SSA and MENA dummies are fragile determinants of FDI. One of the plausible 
explanations is the weak institutions in these regions. 
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(Jensen, 2008 and Li, 2009).
31
 This is consistent with our finding of DEMO as a robust 
determinant with a generally positive coefficient sign. 
 
The Internal and external conflict variable (conflictint) is found to be robust in determining 
FDI with a generally negative coefficient sign. This is consistent with a priori expectations as 
less conflict reduces incertitude amongst potential investors, which raises FDI. As Sacks 
(2003) explains, an investor’s mindset is to invest in a venture if the payoff is high enough 
given the risk. Hence, an increase in institutional quality (as indicated by greater democracy 
and lower conflict) would increase FDI inflow. 
 
Our results also suggest that language can be considered as a dynamic instrument to attract 
FDI. We found that countries that speak Arabic and Spanish increase FDI ceteris paribus. 
The main possible explanation is that the transaction costs of those two languages are higher 
than, for example, French and English (dummies representing countries speaking these latter 
two languages are found to be fragile). Hence, these results are consistent with prior beliefs. 
 
Being a landlocked country is disadvantageous because the country has no direct access to 
seaborne trade. Landlocked developing countries have significantly higher costs of 
international cargo transportation compared to coastal developing countries and more 
freedom to choose their trading partners. It has been found in growth empirics that economic 
growth is negatively affected if a country is landlocked (Easterly and Levine, 2001). 
Consistent with that, we find that coastal countries tend to attract more FDI.
32
 This is 
                                                   
31
 However, Asiedu (2011) finds that democracy attracts FDI in countries where the share of natural resources in 
total exports is low, but has a negative effect on FDI in countries where exports are dominated by natural 
resources. This statement may to some extent explain why we did not find the SSA and Mena regions as robust 
determinants of FDI (the countries in these regions have weak democracy and their exports are dominated by 
natural resources).  
32
 As an interesting aside, the surface area of a country is not a robust determinant of FDI.  
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consistent with our finding that the dummy variable “landunlocked”, measuring countries that 
are not landlocked, is a robust determinant with a generally positive sign. We also find that 
countries with more than 3 boundaries attract more FDI than those with fewer boundaries 
given the robust and generally positive coefficient. This is also in the spirit of the previous 
finding (the landlocked feature): a country with more neighbours has more freedom to trade. 
Hence, there are better prospects for incoming FDI. While “landlockdeness” has been 
emphasised in the past as a factor affecting growth and FDI, the finding that the numbers of 
borders affects FDI is, we believe, novel.    
 
Natural resource abundance in the form of oil and gas (oildummy and gasdummy, 
respectively) are found to be robust determinants of FDI with generally negative coefficient 
signs. Our finding is consistent with the results of Sachs and Warner (1995, 1999) who find 
that the natural resource abundance induces a kind of ‘Dutch disease’ that affects growth 
negatively. Furthermore, as has been suggested by Tietenburg (2006), large rents in the 
natural resource sector crowd out investment in other sectors, and therefore possibly inward 
FDI. This reasoning will of course not apply to specifically resource-seeking firms, which 
would naturally be attracted by resource abundance; this would explain the inflows of FDI 
into the Arab Gulf and African countries.  
 
Finally, rule of law, parliamentary regime and the Europe and central Asia dummy variables 
are found to be possible determinants of FDI while all other geopolitical variables exert only 
a fragile influence on FDI. As mentioned, political and other institutions are a vibrant area of 
research in growth theory and empirics (see e.g. Easterly et al., 2004; Glaeser et al., 2004; 
and the review of Durlauf et al., 2005).  
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From Table 8 we see that eight non-core economic variables are robust determinants of FDI 
according to Sala-i-Martin’s criteria. These are CAB, GDPG, GDPP, CGD, FDIO, 
INTERNET, RATIOT and TEL.  
 
[Insert Table 8] 
 
The findings in Table 8 are similar to those in Table 6 in that FDIO, RATIOT, CAB, GDPG 
and GDPP are found to be robust in both of our EBA applications. The average coefficient 
signs are the same in Table 8 and Table 6 except for RATIOT which has a generally negative 
coefficient sign in Table 8; this is rather counterintuitive. This change in coefficient sign 
between the two EBA applications may be due to RATIOS being a core variable in the 
second application and not the first. This broadly confirms the robustness of these results. 
Table 8 suggests three additional robust variables, which are central government debt (CGD), 
internet use (internet) and telephone mainline use (TEL). CGD appears as robust with a 
generally negative coefficient: this is expected, as debt may have a number of adverse 
consequences, such as inducing higher interest rates and raising default risk. The latter two 
capture communication facilities. As expected an increase in internet and telephone use 
increases FDI inflows as indicated by the generally positive coefficient signs for these 
variables.  
 
Four variables, (LIQUID, POPTL, GCF and TAXPROFR) are considered “possible” 
determinants of FDI. The last two variables (GCF and TAXPROFR) were also found to be 
“possible” determinants of FDI in our first EBA application indicating some further 
consistency of results. All of the other variables in our second EBA application are fragile.   
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Overall, our results in Table 7 and 8 are in accordance with the literature, and support the 
hypotheses that market size and market potential, human capital and communication facilities 
as well as the availability of natural resources robustly determine FDI inflows. However, we 
note that 37 of the 55 variables considered in our second EBA application are not robust. In 
addition, we are cautious in concluding that the 3 potentially endogenous variables (GDPP, 
GDPG and CAB) are robust determinants of FDI. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
We investigate the determinants of FDI using an unbalanced panel dataset covering 168 
countries over the period 1970 to 2006. We consider 58 economic, geographical and political 
variables that have been previously proposed as determinants of FDI using EBA to address 
the issue of model uncertainty. As far as we are aware this is the most variables that have 
been considered using the largest coverage of data in any EBA application of the 
determinants of FDI. Our EBA application to FDI extends previous work in its use of a large 
unbalanced panel data set instead of just cross-sectional data which the majority of previous 
analyses of FDI employ. Further, we consider a larger number of economic, political and 
geographical variables than has been previously used in one empirical investigation in the 
literature. We particularly emphasize the novelty of our use of political and geographical  
factors. In these respects we believe our work significantly extends the existing literature that 
seeks to understand the determinants of FDI. 
 
We find that the Sala-i-Martin (1997) EBA approach is more ‘permissive’ than the Leamer 
(1983) method. This is because no variables are found to be robust using the Leamer method, 
whereas robust determinants can be identified using Sala-i-Martin’s approach. This confirms 
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the conclusions of the previous literature that the Leamer criterion is likely to be too strict to 
usefully uncover the determinants of any particular variable. In contrast, Sala-i-Martin’s 
approach can discern those determinants that are robust and those that are not. 
 
In our first EBA application that only considers economic determinants of FDI we find that 
the following six variables (excluding the 3 potentially endogenous covariates) have a robust 
relationship (with average coefficient signs that are consistent with theoretical expectations) 
according to both of Sala-i-Martin’s CDF criteria: Open, FDIO, GFE, Hmtaxcor, Ratiot and 
Ratios. Based upon this we use Open, GFE and Ratios as the core variables in our second 
EBA application that considers both economic and geopolitical determinants of FDI. 
 
According to both of Sala-i-Martin’s (1997) CDF criteria our second EBA application reveals 
that 18 of the 55 (non-core) variables are robust determinants of FDI. There are ten robust 
geopolitical determinants that suggest the following relations with inward FDI. Countries 
located in South Asia, East Asia and the pacific region, that have more than 3 boundaries, 
that are not land-locked, that are Spanish or Arabic speaking, that have greater democratic 
accountability and that experience less conflict attract more FDI. These results are consistent 
with theoretical expectations and Globerman and Shapiro (2002) who concluded that 
democratic governance as well as a reasonable level of peace and order and infrastructure are 
perquisites for greater FDI inflows. Additionally, we re-affirm the Sachs and Warner (1995, 
1999) findings that natural resource abundance induces a “Dutch disease”; they explored the 
effect for growth, while here we find that this affects negatively incoming FDI.   
 
The three core economic variables used in our second EBA application were not tested for 
robustness. Nevertheless, these three variables – trade (openness), government expenditure 
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and human capital (secondary enrolment rates) – are presented as robust determinants of FDI. 
 
Excluding the three potentially endogenous variables there are five robust (non-core) 
economic determinants of inward FDI identified by our second EBA application. Notably 
RATIOT is robust and has a generally negative coefficient which means that FDI tends to be 
horizontal rather than vertical. Indeed, the finding that tertiary enrolment rates are robust in 
the second EBA is consistent with secondary enrolment rates being robust in our first EBA. 
However, RATIOT had a robust and generally positive coefficient in the first EBA 
application and a robust and negative average coefficient in the second. This change in 
coefficient sign between the two EBA applications may be due to RATIOS being a core 
variable in the second application and not the first. The 4 economic variables, FDIO, 
INTERNET, TEL and CGD are robust and have average coefficient signs that are consistent 
with theoretical expectations.  
 
Our study has important implications for policies aimed at promoting FDI and, therefore, 
economic development. For example, countries that reinforce infrastructure facilities, 
liberalise local and global investment policy and maintain macroeconomic and political 
stability will improve inward FDI performance and become an attractive destination for 
foreign investors.  
 
Thus, open, ratios and ratiot are policy variables as they can be directly influenced by policy 
makers in the short run, for example via changes in tax, public R&D expenditures, or bilateral 
investment treaties etc. At the same time market size and political risk are ‘intervention 
variables’ which can only be indirectly influenced by policy makers and/or changed in the 
medium to long run. These policies should contribute to closing the gap between actual and 
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potential FDI. 
 
In addition to our broader coverage of determinants and larger dataset we propose three 
possible explanations regarding the differences between our results and previous results.  
First, it is possible that foreign investment is attracted by a variety of determinants, a few 
being predominant (such as openness, government spending and human capital ) and other 
less relevant. Therefore, different sets of determinants are sufficient to attract FDI as long as 
oppeness and human capital exists in the particular country. Second, the FDI performance 
may be driven by specific determinants over a particular period reflecting strengths (such as 
natural resources and good institutions) and weaknesses (for example, being in the early stage 
of economic development compared with more mature economies) of each country relative to 
the endowment in those determinants. Third, for a given sector, the production of this sector 
may be of different range or quality across countries (luxury and low-range products) and 
hence, investment in that sector may be responsive to different FDI determinants relative to 
the range.  
 
The econometric approach presented in this paper attempts to measure the influence on FDI 
of not only economic factors that economists have traditionally considered, but also 
geopolitical variables measuring political instability, government efficiency, geographic 
closeness and cultural similarity. By using this extended set of varaibles we hope to provide a 
more complete picture of the interaction of local and global forces that impact decisions to 
invest abroad. 
 
Our results suggest that economic institutions matter in attracting FDI because they shape and 
influence investments in physical and human capital technology and the organization of 
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production. However, geopolitical variables also matter, especially for less developed 
countries. Poor political institutions lead to poor infrastructure, low expected profitability and 
less FDI. 
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Table 1: List of economic variables used in the first EBA application 
 Variable 
code 
 Variable DESCRIPTION Estimated 
sign in past  
literature 
Source 
 (
   
 
)  Dependent variable : the ratio of inward 
FDI to GDP 
 WDI(2006) 
1 Open Trade  + WDI(2006) 
2 Infl Inflation - WDI(2006) 
3 GDPP GDP per capita, PPP  + WDI(2006) 
4 Gdpg GDP growth  + WDI(2006) 
5 Cab Current account balance   -/+ WDI(2006) 
6 Ttrade Taxes on international trade  - WDI(2006) 
7 Cgd Central government debt  WDI(2006) 
8 Fdio Foreign direct investment, net outflows   + WDI(2006) 
9 Gcf Gross fixed capital formation   + WDI(2006) 
10 Gfe Government final  expenditure + WDI(2006) 
11 Gs Gross savings (current US$) +/ WDI(2006) 
12 Hmtaxcor Highest marginal tax  corporate rate  - WDI(2006) 
13 Internet Internet users   + WDI(2006) 
14 Intsprd Interest rate spread    - WDI(2006) 
15 Liquid Liquid liabilities +/- WDI(2006) 
16 Lir Lending interest rate   - WDI(2006) 
17 Nreserve Total reserves  + WDI(2006) 
18 Poptl Total population  + WDI(2006) 
19 Rail Rail lines  + WDI(2006) 
20 Ratiop Primary school enrolment/labour force -/+ WDI(2006) 
21 Ratios  Secondary school enrolment /labor force -/+ WDI(2006) 
22 Ratiot Tertiary school enrolment/labor force -/+ WDI(2006) 
23 Rex Real exchange rate  - WDI(2006) 
24 Rir Real interest rate - WDI(2006) 
25 Roads Roads, total network    + WDI(2006) 
26 Taxprofr Taxes on income, profits    - WDI(2006) 
27 Tel Telephone mainlines  + WDI(2006) 
28 Timeb Time required to start a business  - WDI(2006) 
29 Unem Unemployment, total  + WDI(2006) 
30 Wgetogdpl Wage to GDP ratio +/- WDI(2006) 
 
 
Note : ‘Sign’ refers to the expected sign : ‘+,-‘ denotes a positive/negative relation according 
to the literature while +/- denotes an a priori ambiguous effect. WDI denotes the Word 
Development Index from World Bank (2006). 
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Table 2: List of geographical and political variables used in the second EBA application 
  
 Variable code  Variables description Estimated 
sign in 
past 
literature 
Source 
31 ARB Arabic where main language dummy none constructed 
32 bureau Bureaucracy  +/- ICRG 
33 conflictint International conflict + ICRG 
34 corr Corruption rates - ICRG 
35 demo Democracy + ICRG 
36 law Rule of law + ICRG 
37 ethnic Ethnic tension none ICRG 
38 commu Communist regime none constructed 
39 repb Republic regime none constructed 
40 surface Total surface of the country + WDI 
41 Eng Countries where main language is English + constructed 
42 Spn Countries where main language is Spanish + constructed 
43 frc Countries where main language is French none constructed 
44 rtead Rate of administration efficiency none constructed 
45 parl Parliamentary  regime none constructed 
46 EAP East Asia and pacific regional dummy + constructed 
47 ECA Europe and central Asia regional dummy + constructed 
48 LAC Latin America and Carabbean regional Dummy + constructed 
49 SSA Sub –Saharan African regional dummy - constructed 
50 SA South Asia regional dummy + constructed 
51 MENA Middle east and north Africa dummy +/- constructed 
52 wto Countries that are member of WTO  none constructed 
53 gasdummy Gas dummy variables + constructed 
54 landunlocked  landunlocked country dummy + constructed 
55 oildummy Oïl dummy variable  + constructed 
56 gtbun Total boundaries of the country exceed 3 + constructed 
57 sbun Total boundaries of the country are below 3 + constructed 
58 nobund No boundaries in this country - constructed 
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Table 3: First EBA application with only economic variables - results for Open 
     Obs AVG 
coeft. 
AVG 
S.E. 
AVG  
T 
           ( )     ( )  Robustness 
GDPP 561 0.059 0.019 3.116 -0.030 0.310 0.986 0.999 robust *** 
Gdpg 561 0.053 0.019 2.816 -0.060 0.330 0.983 0.997 robust*** 
Cab 561 0.063 0.018 3.587 -1.110 0.380 0.990 0.992 robust*** 
Cgd 558 0.914 0.028 3.191 -0.090 0.460 0.994 1.000 robust*** 
Fdio 560 0.056 0.019 3.092 -0.080 0.290 0.993 0.998 robust*** 
Gcf 560 0.057 0.019 3.074 -0.040 0.310 0.990 0.999 robust*** 
GFE 561 0.059 0.018 3.223 -0.032 0.282 0.992 1.000 robust*** 
Gs 561 0.063 0.023 3.154 -0.010 0.330 0.992 0.999 robust*** 
Hmtaxcor 561 0.108 0.037 3.002 -0.170 0.460 0.984 0.998 robust*** 
Internet 561 0.073 0.021 3.450 -0.030 0.320 0.994 1.000 robust*** 
Intresprd 562 0.064 0.021 3.147 -0.093 0.396 0.991 0.999 robust*** 
Liquid 561 0.031 0.019 2.022 -0.168 0.330 0.906 0.951 robust** 
Lir 561 0.062 0.020 3.148 -0.031 0.390 0.993 0.999 robust*** 
Nreserve 561 0.053 0.028 2.659 -0.331 0.402 0.929 0.972 robust** 
Poptl 561 0.069 0.024 2.734 -0.062 0.371 0.985 0.998 robust*** 
Rail 562 0.072 0.027 2.725 -0.168 0.460 0.981 0.996 robust*** 
Ratiop 562 0.069 0.025 2.660 -0.040 0.412 0.982 0.997 robust*** 
Ratios 561 0.068 0.027 2.525 -0.140 0.400 0.980 0.995 robust*** 
Ratiot 561 0.057 0.019 3.118 -0.030 0.321 0.987 0.999 robust*** 
Rex 562 0.155 0.039 0.625 -0.740 0.295 0.952 1.000 robust*** 
Rir 561 0.062 0.020 3.141 -0.040 0.380 0.992 0.999 robust*** 
Roads 561 0.044 0.022 2.112 -0.120 0.280 0.951 0.980 robust** 
Taxprofr 561 0.061 0.019 3.314 -0.030 0.330 0.991 0.999 robust*** 
Tel 561 0.057 0.017 2.519 -0.023 0.300 0.958 1.000 robust*** 
Timeb 561 0.020 0.072 0.500 -0.610 0.600 0.672 0.607 fragile 
Unem 561 0.091 0.023 3.974 -0.020 0.380 0.999 1.000 robust*** 
Wgetogdl 561 0.061 0.020 3.142 -0.030 0.320 0.988 0.999 robust*** 
Table 3 notes. The first column (headed       ) reports the variable of interest used in the 
EBA application and the results relate to the core variable Open. “Obs” gives the actual 
number of regression estimated for each      while “AVG coeft” represents the variable’s 
coefficient averaged over the number regressions (Obs) used in the EBA application. “AVG 
S.E.” and “AVG T” denote the averaged coefficient standard error and absolute t-ratio 
(“AVG T”), respectively.       and       give Leamer’s lower and upper bounds, 
respectively. Sala-i-Martin’s (1997) non-normal CDF is denoted “   ( )  and the normal 
CDF is “   ( )”. “Robustness” indicates whether a variable is robust (and its degree of 
robustness), possibly robust or fragile, based upon Sala-i-Martin’s criteria. *** denotes 
robustness at the 0.99 level, ** at the 0.95 level and * at the 0.90 level. 
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Table 4: First EBA application with only economic variables - results for Infl 
     Obs AVG 
coeft. 
AVG 
S.E. 
AVG  
T 
           ( )     ( )  Robustness 
GDPP 561 -0.003 0.010 1.034 -0.510 0.700 0.806 0.623 fragile 
Gdpg 561 -0.001 0.011 0.847 -0.520 0.720 0.764 0.524 fragile 
Cab 561 -0.003 0.013 1.107 -0.520 0.750 0.813 0.605 fragile 
Cgd 560 -0.011 0.021 0.418 -0.800 1.270 0.631 0.705 fragile 
Fdio 560 -0.003 0.013 1.060 -0.500 0.770 0.813 0.574 fragile 
Gcf 560 -0.002 0.010 0.993 -0.410 0.870 0.797 0.571 fragile 
GFE 561 -0.003 0.010 0.854 -0.440 0.700 0.766 0.608 fragile 
Gs 561 -0.002 0.011 0.963 -0.630 0.650 0.789 0.568 fragile 
Hmtaxcor 561 -0.013 0.065 0.592 -0.980 1.680 0.699 0.579 fragile 
Internet 561 -0.001 0.013 1.246 -0.530 0.690 0.837 0.827 possible 
Intresprd 562 -0.005 0.016 0.850 -0.710 1.680 0.770 0.624 fragile 
Liquid 561 -0.007 0.021 1.143 -0.797 0.804 0.832 0.827 possible 
Lir 561 -0.003 0.013 0.853 -0.610 0.980 0.768 0.606 fragile 
Nreserve 561 -0.015 0.034 0.947 -0.760 2.040 0.793 0.665 fragile 
Poptl 561 -0.004 0.023 0.995 -0.630 0.790 0.793 0.570 fragile 
Rail 562 -0.002 0.023 0.756 -0.008 0.003 0.749 0.526 fragile 
Ratiop 562 0.001 0.016 0.823 -0.849 0.660 0.770 0.524 fragile 
Ratios 561 -0.005 0.023 0.750 -0.800 1.270 0.748 0.775 fragile 
Ratiot 561 -0.020 0.029 1.187 -0.759 0.763 0.909 0.962 robust** 
Rex 561 -0.013 0.036 0.229 -1.430 1.930 0.766 0.779 fragile 
Rir 561 -0.004 0.010 0.667 -0.690 1.020 0.598 0.656 fragile 
Roads 561 -0.004 0.020 1.094 -0.640 1.130 0.812 0.570 fragile 
Taxprofr 561 -0.002 0.011 0.953 -0.640 0.750 0.784 0.586 fragile 
Tel 561 -0.004 0.019 1.098 -0.980 0.580 0.805 0.583 fragile 
Timeb 561 0.141 0.177 0.949 -1.580 5.240 0.808 0.807 possible 
Unem 561 -0.010 0.022 1.098 -0.630 1.180 0.814 0.684 fragile 
Wgetogdl 561 -0.005 0.010 1.142 -0.540 0.710 0.611 0.682 fragile 
Table 4 notes. The first column (headed       ) reports the variable of interest used in the 
EBA application and the results relate to the core variable Infl. All other labels are defined as 
in Table 3. 
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Table 5: First EBA application with only economic variables - results for Ttrade 
     Obs AVG 
coeft. 
AVG 
S.E. 
AVG  
T 
           ( )     ( )  Robustness 
GDPP 561 -0.002 0.059 0.007 -1.200 1.300 0.736 0.712 fragile 
Gdpg 561 -0.001 0.059 0.001 -1.260 1.270 0.754 0.503 fragile 
Cab 561 -0.008 0.061 1.277 -1.370 1.190 0.747 0.754 fragile 
Cgd 561 0.696 0.110 0.565 -2.920 1.990 0.956 1.000 robust*** 
Fdio 560 0.002 0.061 0.903 -1.240 1.230 0.756 0.616 fragile 
Gcf 560 0.003 0.059 0.945 -1.130 1.200 0.764 0.718 fragile 
GFE 561 0.009 0.059 0.907 -0.783 1.278 0.758 0.560 fragile 
Gs 561 0.002 0.065 0.879 -1.372 1.228 0.750 0.510 fragile 
Hmtaxcor 561 0.034 0.099 0.441 -2.926 1.990 0.665 0.636 fragile 
Internet 561 0.046 0.071 0.910 -1.230 1.407 0.764 0.739 fragile 
Intresprd 562 0.014 0.070 0.898 -2.920 1.990 0.770 0.581 fragile 
Liquid 561 -0.010 0.064 1.074 -1.550 1.804 0.775 0.563 fragile 
Lir 561 0.013 0.065 0.797 -1.650 1.270 0.750 0.577 fragile 
Nreserve 561 -0.006 0.102 0.820 -4.380 3.430 0.744 0.522 fragile 
Poptl 561 0.040 0.080 0.670 -1.420 1.360 0.670 0.694 fragile 
Rail 562 0.005 0.101 0.868 -2.820 1.290 0.759 0.520 fragile 
Ratiop 562 0.034 0.084 0.613 -1.680 1.157 0.715 0.659 fragile 
Ratios 561 0.047 0.108 0.667 -2.160 1.940 0.723 0.668 fragile 
Ratiot 561 0.007 0.059 0.893 -1.261 1.342 0.752 0.744 fragile 
Rex 561 0.155 0.189 0.128 -8.080 1.080 0.824 0.894 possible 
Rir 561 0.013 0.064 0.817 -1.640 1.220 0.753 0.579 fragile 
Roads 561 0.058 0.075 0.134 -1.430 1.930 0.766 0.779 fragile 
Taxprofr 561 -0.007 0.060 0.056 -1.380 1.220 0.757 0.544 fragile 
Tel 561 0.063 0.060 1.173 -1.120 1.150 0.845 0.854 possible 
Timeb 561 -0.088 0.353 0.530 -12.100 4.330 0.675 0.598 fragile 
Unem 561 0.078 0.089 0.996 -2.048 1.330 0.807 0.812 possible 
Wgetogdl 561 0.028 0.070 0.793 -1.290 1.280 0.740 0.653 fragile 
Table 5 notes. The first column (headed       ) reports the variable of interest used in the 
EBA application and the results relate to the core variable Ttrade. All other labels are defined 
as in Table 3. 
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Table 6: First EBA application with only economic variables - results for      
     Obs AVG 
coeft. 
AVG S.E. AVG  
T 
           ( )     ( )  Robustness 
GDPP 561 0.004 0.001 2.052 -0.010 0.006 0.939 0.981 robust** 
gdpg 561 0.078 0.052 1.896 -0.600 0.810 0.917 0.931 robust* 
cab 561 -0.123 0.018 3.599      -0.039      0.331      0.995 0.999  robust*** 
Hmtaxcor 561 -0.157 0.076 2.039 -0.560 3.8*      0.940 0.981 robust** 
fdio 560 0.055 0.039 1.473 -0.390 0.310 0.905 0.922 robust* 
gcf 560 0.057 0.073 1.499 -0.590 1.520 0.835 0.817 possible 
GFE 561 -0.174 0.112 1.496 -3.570 0.400 1.000 0.940 robust*** 
Ratiot 561 0.018 0.026 1.153 -0.610 0.880 0.987 0.950 robust** 
Ratios 561 0.355 0.096 4.077 -0.770 1.100 0.995 1.000 robust*** 
Internet 561 -0.001 0.002 1.098 -0.020 0.010 0.764 0.636 fragile 
Intresprd 562 0.019 0.041 0.781 -0.650 1.720 0.753 0.679 fragile 
Liquid 561 0.010 0.026 1.517 -0.300 0.620 0.680 0.648 fragile 
Lir 561 -0.004 0.020 0.803 -0.370 0.740 0.751 0.579 fragile 
Nreserve 561 1.8*      1.6*      0.519 -3.7*      5.34*      0.682 0.544 fragile 
Poptl 561 0.008 0.052 0.759 -0.820 0.480 0.749 0.558 fragile 
Rail 562 0.001 0.004 0.522 -0.010 0.004 0.679 0.600 fragile 
Ratiop 562 -0.019 0.047 0.759 -0.710 0.410 0.742 0.660 fragile 
cgd 560 -0.005 0.024 0.620 -0.430 0.250 0.700 0.585 fragile 
Gs 561 4.03*      6.99*      0.707 9.54*      3.8*      0.733 0.718 fragile 
Rex 561 -0.015 0.027 0.242 -0.560 0.120 0.720 0.715 fragile 
Rir 561 -0.007 0.028 0.649 -0.730 0.640 0.713 0.596 fragile 
Roads 561 3.46*     2.19*     0.402   -2*     -3*     0.645 0.563 fragile 
Taxprofr 561 -0.041 0.040 1.248 -0.530 0.440 0.840 0.842 possible 
Tel 561 0.004 0.019 1.048 -0.980 0.580 0.805 0.835 possible 
Timeb 561 -0.025 0.039 0.810 -0.245 0.281 0.760 0.741 fragile 
Unem 561 -0.104 0.140 0.781 -3.510 0.500 0.744 0.771 fragile 
Wgetogdl 561 0.180 0.735 1.274 -5.570 8.460 0.841 0.818 possible 
Table 6 notes. The first column (headed       ) reports the variable of interest used in the 
EBA application and the results relate to     . All other labels are defined as in Table 3. 
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Table 7: Second EBA application with economic and geopolitical variables -      results 
     Obs AVG 
coeft. 
AVG 
S.E. 
AVG  
T 
           ( )     ( )  Robustness 
Arb 1739 16.223 4.675 2.114 -4.245 7.531 0.97 1.00 robust *** 
Sa 1746 19.505 4.794 2.794 -2.448 4.794 0.98 1.00 robust *** 
landunlocked 1750 0.696 0.110 0.565 -2.920 1.990 0.95 1.000 robust*** 
Spn 1750 0.953 3.461 0.417 -15.732 18.656 0.965 0.961 robust * 
Gtbun 1750 1.162 2.503 0.729 -16.750 13.364 0.98 0.950 robust** 
Eap  1750  4.371 3.900 1.423 -27.229 21.134 0.90 0.92 robust * 
Demo 1750 0.340 0.246 1.421 -0.258 0.422 0.90 0.91 robust * 
Conflictint 1750 -0.216 0.344 2.348 -8.326 2.826 0.95 0.90 robust * 
Oildummy 1750 -3.332 2.564 1.281 -0.459 2.564 0.94 0.90 robust * 
gasdummy 1750 -3.213 2.458 0.895 -1.229 2.458 0.93 0.90 robust * 
 parl 1750 -1.240 2.506 0.685 -13.848 13.038 0.83 0.85 possible 
Law      1750 -1.189 2.983 1.508 -43.162 21.269 0.88 0.85 possible 
Eca 1750 2.494 2.900 1.023 -8.874 14.118 0.81 0.80 possible 
Eng 1750 -2.039 2.533 0.986 -14.727 13.171 0.81 0.78 fragile 
Sbun 1750 1.944 2.574 0.717 -2.445 2.574 0.74 0.77 fragile 
ssa 1750 -2.040 2.776 0.871 -13.512 13.499 0.77 0.76 fragile 
Repb  1750 0.127 0.208 0.916 -0.452 0.235 0.77 0.72 fragile 
Mena 1750 -1.747 3.949 0.601 -27.537 26.544 0.70 0.67 fragile 
Ethnic 1750 -0.093 0.223 0.924 -1.445 0.387 0.77 0.66 fragile 
nobund 1750 -1.269 3.436 0.587 -10.131 19.890 0.70 0.64 fragile 
Surface 1750 1.8*     5.6*     0.365 -3.87*     1.09*     0.63 0.62 fragile 
Lac 1750 0.847 3.002 0.874 -4.230 11.141 0.75 0.61 fragile 
rtead 1750 0.007 0.059 0.893 -1.261 4.330 0.675 0.598 fragile 
bureau 1750 0.187 0.237 1.098 -0.995 0.453 0.60 0.58 fragile 
Frc 1750 0.563 3.475 0.751 -6.357 16.290 0.72 0.56 fragile 
Wto 1725 -0.898 5.860 0.881 -28.936 34.434 0.74 0.56 fragile 
Corr 1750 0.030 0.252 0.583 -1.015 0.483 0.70 0.54 fragile 
Commu 1750 0.166 3.129 0.826 -12.418 24.418 0.64 0.52 fragile 
 
Table 7 notes. The first column (headed       ) reports the variable of interest used in the 
EBA application and the results relate to     . All other labels are defined as in Table 3.  
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Table 8: Second EBA application with economic and geopolitical variables -      results  
     Obs AVG 
coeft. 
AVG S.E. AVG  
T 
           ( )     ( )  Robustness 
Fdio 1313 0.733 0.050 50.477 -0.740 0.233 0.985 1.000 robust*** 
Cgd 1311 0.696 0.0505 50.477 -2.920 1.990 0.983 1.000 robust*** 
Cab 1313 -0.123 0.018 3.599 -0.039 0.331 0.995 0.999 robust*** 
Internet 1311 0.010 0.004 1.327 -0.044 0.020 0.984 0.988 robust** 
Gdpp 1313 0.004 0.001 2.052 -0.010 0.006 0.939 0.981 robust** 
Ratiot 1520 -5.718 3.441 1.516 -51.899 21.403 0.907 0.950 robust** 
Tel 1521 0.010 0.006 1.534 -0.010 0.006 0.919 0.944 robust** 
Gdpg 1313 0.078 0.052 1.896 -0.600 0.810 0.917 0.931 robust* 
Liquid 1311 0.011 0.009 1.323 -0.050 0.012 0.841 0.892 possible 
Gcf 1311 0.161 0.143 2.826 -1.192 1.808 0.870 0.869 possible 
Taxprofr 1088 -0.041 0.040 1.248 -0.530 0.440 0.840 0.842 possible 
Poptl 1311 0.196 0.232 1.166 -2.025 1.304 0.814 0.800 possible 
Hmtaxcor 1520 -0.202 0.216 0.849 -3.510 0.500 0.744 0.771 fragile 
Rir 1636 0.017 0.030 0.600 -0.087 0.030 0.583 0.716 fragile 
Rex 1311 -0.020 0.058 0.665 -0.914 0.871 0.722 0.715 fragile 
Unem  1088 0.069 0.139 0.831 -0.327 1.900 0.753 0.691 fragile 
Ttrade 1331 -0.021 0.043 0.801 -0.242 0.109 0.753 0.684 fragile 
Intresprd 1311 0.019 0.041 0.781 -0.650 1.720 0.753 0.679 fragile 
Roads 1331 8.509*     2.212*     0.398 -6.247*     4.673*     0.647 0.649 fragile 
Nreserve 1520 5.989*      1.858*      0.610 -4.628*      3.527*      0.708 0.626 fragile 
Wgetogdl 1520 -8.698 37.807 0.707 -85.473 103.13 0.726 0.591 fragile 
Lir 1311 0.004 0.027 0.593 -0.148 0.096 0.696 0.579 fragile 
Rail 1311 7.076*     3.767*     0.426 -0.0003 0.0002 0.655 0.574 fragile 
Gs 1311 -4.309*      2.509*      0.475 -6.057*      4.546*      0.670 0.568 fragile 
Timeb 1141 -0.002 0.013 0.898 -0.028 0.017 0.787 0.562 fragile 
Inflation 1311 -0.005 0.036 0.477 -1.335 1.374 0.668 0.560 fragile 
Ratiop 1520 3.939*     0.003 0.300 -0.007 0.009 0.610 0.504 fragile 
 
Table 8 notes. The first column (headed       ) reports the variable of interest used in the 
EBA application and the results relate to     . All other labels are defined as in Table 3.  
 
 
